IT 1
is with reluctance that I rise to express a disapprobation of
any one article of the plan for which we are so much obliged to
the honorable gentlemen who laid it before us. From its first
reading I have borne a good will to it, and, in general, wished
it success. In this particular of salaries to the executive
branch, I happen to differ; and, as my opinion may appear new
and chimerical, it is only from a persuasion that it is right,
and from a sense of duty, that I hazard it. The committee will
judge of my reasons when they have heard them, and their
judgment may possibly change mine. I think I see inconveniences
in the appointment of salaries; I see none in refusing them,
but, on the contrary, great advantages. |
Sir, there are two passions which have a powerful
influence in the affairs of men. These are ambition and
avarice—the love of power and the love of money. Separately,
each of these has great force in prompting men to action; but,
when united in view of the same object, they have, in many
minds, the most violent effects. Place before the eyes of such
men a post of honor, that shall, at the same time, be a place of
profit, and they will move heaven and earth to obtain it. The
vast number of such places it is that renders the British
government so tempestuous. The struggles for them are the true
source of all those factions which are perpetually dividing the
nation, distracting its councils, hurrying it sometimes into
fruitless and mischievous wars, and often compelling a
submission to dishonorable terms of peace. |
And of what kind are the men that will strive for this
profitable preeminence, through all the bustle of cabal, the
heat of contention, the infinite mutual abuse of parties,
tearing to pieces the best of characters? It will not be the
wise and moderate, the lovers of peace and good order, the men
fittest for the trust. It will be the bold and the violent, the
men of strong passions and indefatigable activity in their
selfish pursuits. These will thrust themselves into your
government and be your rulers. And these, too, will be mistaken
in the expected happiness of their situation, for their
vanquished competitors, of the same spirit, and from the same
motives, will perpetually be endeavoring to distress their
administration, thwart their measures, and render them odious to
the people. |
Besides these evils, sir, tho we may set out in the
beginning with moderate salaries, we shall find that such will
not be of long continuance. Reasons will never be wanting for
proposed augmentations; and there will always be a party for
giving more to the rulers, that the rulers may be able, in
return, to give more to them. Hence, as all history informs us,
there has been in every state and kingdom a constant kind of
warfare between the governing and the governed; the one striving
to obtain more for its support, and the other to pay less. And
this has alone occasioned great convulsions, actual civil wars,
ending either in dethroning of the princes or enslaving of the
people. |
Generally, indeed, the ruling power carries its point, and
we see the revenues of princes constantly increasing, and we see
that they are never satisfied, but always in want of more. The
more the people are discontented with the oppression of taxes,
the greater need the prince has of money to distribute among his
partizans, and pay the troops that are to suppress all
resistance, and enable him to plunder at pleasure. There is
scarce a king in a hundred who would not, if he could, follow
the example of Pharaoh—get first all the people’s money, then
all their lands, and then make them and their children servants
for ever. It will be said that we do not propose to establish
kings. I know it. But there is a natural inclination in mankind
to kingly government. It sometimes relieves them from
aristocratic domination. They would rather have one tyrant than
five hundred. It gives more of the appearance of equality among
citizens; and that they like. |
I am apprehensive, therefore—perhaps too apprehensive—that
the government of the States may, in future times, end in a
monarchy. But this catastrophe, I think, may be long delayed, if
in our proposed system we do not sow the seeds of contention,
faction, and tumult, by making our posts of honor places of
profit. If we do, I fear that, tho we employ at first a number
and not a single person, the number will, in time, be set aside;
it will only nourish the fetus of a king (as the honorable
gentleman from Virginia very aptly expressed it), and a king
will the sooner be set over us. |
It may be imagined by some that this is a Utopian idea,
and that we can never find men to serve us in the executive
department without paying them well for their services. I
conceive this to be a mistake. Some existing facts present
themselves to me which incline me to a contrary opinion. The
high sheriff of a county in England is an honorable office, but
it is not a profitable one. It is rather expensive, and
therefore not sought for. But yet it is executed, and well
executed, and usually by some of the principal gentlemen of the
county. In France the office of counselor, or member of their
judiciary parliament, is more honorable. It is therefore
purchased at a high price; there are, indeed, fees on the law
proceedings, which are divided among them, but these fees do not
amount to more than three per cent. on the sum paid for the
place. Therefore, as legal interest is there at five per cent.,
they, in fact, pay two per cent. for being allowed to do the
judiciary business of the nation, which is, at the same time,
entirely exempt from the burden of paying them any salaries for
their services. |
I do not, however, mean to recommend this as an eligible
mode for our judiciary department. I only bring the instance to
show that the pleasure of doing good and serving their country,
and the respect such conduct entitles them to, are sufficient
motives with some minds to give up a great portion of their time
to the public, without the mean inducement of pecuniary
satisfaction. |
Another instance is that of a respectable society who have
made the experiment and practised it with success now more than
a hundred years. I mean the Quakers. It is an established rule
with them that they are not to go to law, but in their
controversies they must apply to their monthly, quarterly, and
yearly meetings. Committees of these sit with patience to hear
the parties, and spend much time in composing their differences.
In doing this they are supported by a sense of duty and the
respect paid to usefulness. It is honorable to be so employed,
but it was never made profitable by salaries, fees, or
perquisites. And, indeed, in all cases of public service, the
less the profit, the greater the honor. |
To bring the matter nearer home, have we not seen the
greatest and most important of our offices, that of general of
our armies, executed for eight years together, without the
smallest salary, by a patriot whom I will not now offend by any
other praise; and this, through fatigues and distresses, in
common with the other brave men, his military friends and
companions, and the constant anxieties peculiar to his station?
And shall we doubt finding three or four men in all the United
States with public spirit enough to bear sitting in peaceful
council, for, perhaps, an equal term, merely to preside over our
civil concerns, and see that our laws are duly executed? Sir, I
have a better opinion of our country. I think we shall never be
without a sufficient number of wise and good men to undertake
and execute well and faithfully the office in question. |
Sir, the saving of the salaries, that may at first be
proposed, is not an object with me. The subsequent mischiefs of
proposing them are what I apprehend. And, therefore, it is that
I move the amendment. If it be not seconded or accepted, I must
be contented with the satisfaction of having delivered my
opinion frankly and done my duty. |
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Note 1. Delivered in
Philadelphia in the Constitutional Convention of 1787. |
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